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INFLUENCERS: NOT SO FLUENT IN 
DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE 
Keith Cooper* 
The Fyre Festival is one of the most infamous disasters in music festi-
val history.  Lesser known to the public is that the influencers involved in 
Fyre Festival’s influencer marketing campaign were required to disclose 
their payments for endorsing the event.  These types of disclosures are regu-
lated by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) pursuant to its authority 
granted under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”).  The disclo-
sure requirement is set forth in the FTC’s Guides Concerning the Use of En-
dorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (“Endorsement Guides”), which 
are nonbinding instructions that educate influencers on how to comply with 
Section 5 of the FTC Act. 
While the FTC pursues companies and influencers that violate the dis-
closure requirements, its attempts are futile due to the Endorsement Guides’ 
nonbinding nature.  With influencer marketing growing rapidly and fraudu-
lent practices becoming rampant, the FTC must make two changes to become 
more effective.  First, the agency must use its rulemaking authority under the 
FTC Act to codify elements of the Endorsement Guides, and other FTC 
works into formal rules that will allow it to seek monetary penalties and con-
sumer redress against violators.  Second, the FTC must mandate disclosure 
provisions to be present in every influencer-company endorsement contract 
to prevent the prevalent deceptive business practice.  By implementing these 
two changes, the FTC will have adequate tools at its disposal to prevent and 
punish violators who previously remained outside its grasp. 
                                                          
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  The author would like to, first and fore-
most, thank God for the blessings that he has provided.  He would like to thank Professor Therese 
Maynard for all of the guidance she has provided on this Note and his law school education.  He 
would like to thank the staff and editors of Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for 
their diligent work and feedback.  Most notably, he would like to thank his grandparents, Roy and 
Linda Cooper, and his parents, Keith Cooper and Shastin Angel, and the rest of his family for their 
love and support. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early morning of April 27, 2017, “chaos” ensued on the sandy 
beaches of the Bahamian Island of Great Exuma.1  Recognized as one of the 
most infamous events in music festival history, the Fyre Festival has been 
the subject of numerous lawsuits stemming from a single disastrous week-
end.2  Festivalgoers were promised a luxurious experience of a lifetime, 
which included “private planes, yachts, villas, wellness activities, free-flow-
ing booze, and the chance of expanding their Instagram following by a few 
thousand.”3  Upon nightfall, anarchy ensued among the guests because there 
was scarce food, electricity, lighting, or basic necessities.4  To add to the 
state of disarray, artists scheduled for the “two transformative weekends” 
canceled days prior to the disastrous event,5 leaving many attendees to spec-
ulate as to whether they were scammed. 
Previously, in December 2016, Fyre Festival, Inc., attempted to make 
a name for itself in the music festival scene and attract the attention of po-
tential festivalgoers by launching its marketing campaign on social media.6  
The company was resilient in its marketing efforts, becoming heavily reliant 
on “influencer marketing,” a growing area of advertising used to recruit 
                                                          
 1. See Abby Ohlheiser, The Complete Disaster of Fyre Festival Played Out on Social Me-




2. See Jack Garson, How to Be an Influencer and Not Get Sued, FORBES (May 7, 2019, 
4:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackgarson/2019/05/07/how-to-be-an-influencer-and-not-
get-sued/#786876bf645a [http://archive.today/r7kzl].  
3. Margaret Abrams, What is Fyre Festival? Guests Who Got Scammed by Billy McFarland 
Tell Their Horrifying Stories, EVENING STANDARD: INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.stand-
ard.co.uk/insider/alist/fyre-festival-what-happened-a4039896.html [https://perma.cc/7AUF-
B49N].  
4. See Ohlheiser, supra note 1.  
5. See id. 
6. No, Fyre Festival Wasn’t an Influencer Marketing Success (and Other Lessons from a 
Disaster), INFLUENCER MARKETINGHUB, https://influencermarketinghub.com/no-fyre-festival-
wasnt-an-influencer-marketing-success-and-other-lessons-from-a-disaster/ (last updated Jan. 31, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/37WJ-E3NH]. 
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concertgoers.7  Influencer marketing is a “type of marketing that focuses on 
using key leaders to drive [a] brand’s message to the larger market.”8  An 
influencer is someone who “exerts” his or her influence in ways that “in-
spire[] or guide[] the actions of others.”9  Seeking to offset the exorbitant 
costs of hosting an event on a private island, Fyre Festival, Inc. jumpstarted 
its marketing efforts by contracting with sixty-three high-profile influencers 
to simultaneously post “a vague orange colored graphic” with the hashtag 
#FyreFest.10   
As over 400 influencers joined Fyre Festival’s marketing ranks, almost 
all of their social media posts failed to comply with the Federal Trade Com-
mission’s (“FTC”) disclosure requirement compelling influencers to inform 
the public of any payments or material benefits received for promoting the 
festival.11  The FTC imposes this disclosure obligation pursuant to Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which entrusts the 
agency with the responsibility of regulating a wide array of business 
                                                          
7. Atanu Shaw, What Marketers Can Learn From the Fyre Festival’s Influencer Marketing 
Fiasco, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescommunica-
tionscouncil/2019/04/16/what-marketers-can-learn-from-the-fyre-festivals-influencer-marketing-
fiasco/#25fb03b31308 [http://archive.today/78v5r]. 
8. Influencer Marketing, TAPINFLUENCE (June 2, 2015), https://www.tapinfluence.com
/blog-what-is-influencer-marketing/#what_is [https://perma.cc/48AE-7JZ4].  Key leaders in this 
area are known as “influencers.”  See The Ultimate Guide to Influencer Marketing, IZEA, https://
izea.com/influencer-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/PB7J-YZ42].  
9. Influencer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/influencer [https://perma.cc/7KXE-JA59].  
10.  No, Fyre Festival Wasn’t an Influencer Marketing Success (and Other Lessons from a 
Disaster), supra note 6.  Among those contracted were celebrities like Kendall Jenner, Emily Rata-
jowski, and Hailey Baldwin, who were each paid excessive sums of money and other incentives in 
exchange for a few social media posts promoting the supposed lucrative event.   
11. See Shaw, supra note 7 (“[Fyre Festival] reportedly spent millions in . . .  payments to 
influencers and celebrities that promoted Fyre . . . [a]nd most of the influencers also violated the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations”).  Fyre Festival “spen[t] millions on flying the mod-
els/influencers down to the Bahamas every other weekend, so the models could take pictures from 
the beach and on yachts,” thereby emitting a luxurious vibe for its promotional content.  No, Fyre 
Festival Wasn’t an Influencer Marketing Success (and Other Lessons from a Disaster), supra note 
6.  See also 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2020) (informing influencers and advertisers that they must fully 
disclose any connection between the parties that might materially affect an endorsement); FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS (2019), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/1001a-influencer-guide-508_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JB76-NNL5].  
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practices, including advertising and its influencer marketing subset.12  Sur-
prisingly, the FTC abrogated this responsibility by not pursuing the parties 
involved in the catastrophic event,13 but even if it had, it was ill-equipped to 
remedy the concertgoers’ losses.14 
To date, influencer marketing has opened a variety of lucrative income-
producing opportunities to all but has remained mostly unregulated.15  With-
out strictly imposed rules and regulations, the lure of fame and substantial 
material compensation has led many individuals and companies to partake 
in deceptive actions to the detriment of consumers when exploiting the dig-
ital marketing method.16  While some influencers are genuinely unfamiliar 
with the disclosure requirements, the mostly unregulated landscape gives 
others the perverse incentive to purposefully provide inadequate disclosure 
with the hope that the endorsed content emits a trustworthy appeal to con-
sumers.17  Consequently, consumers are left speculating as to whether posts 
are sponsored, and many pay the price for an influencer’s failed disclosure 
with no FTC intervention.18 
                                                          
12. The FTC has broad authority to regulate activities involving “unfair” or “deceptive” 
practice that affect commerce.  See Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 
45(a)(1)–(a)(2) (2018).  
13. See Nicholas Sun, Influencers Under Fyre: The Case for Greater Enforcement of FTC 
Endorsement Guidelines Against Social Media Influencers, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Aug. 13, 2019), 
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/announcement/view/184 [https://perma.cc
/G3FB-QYZB].  
14. See discussion infra Part IV.  
15. See Simon Owens, Is It Time to Regulate Social Media Influencers?, N.Y. MAG.: 
INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 17, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/is-it-time-to-regulate-so-
cial-media-influencers.html [http://archive.today/CxQm1].  
16. See id.  
 17. See Complaint at 3, In re Machinima, Inc., No. C-4569 (F.T.C. Mar. 16, 2016) [herein-
after Machinima Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/160317machinimacmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7FZ-REEQ] (“[T]he influencers agreed to keep 
confidential at all times in perpetuity all matters relating to their agreement with Respondent.”); 
see also Complaint at 2, In re Warner Bros. Home Ent. Inc., No. C-4595 (F.T.C. Nov. 17, 2016) 
[hereinafter Warner Bros. Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/cases/161811warner_bros_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8EG-EB28] (“Video[s] will promote 
positive sentiment about the game.”).  
18. See Owens, supra note 15; see also Sun, supra note 13. 
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Part II of this Note discusses the history of influencer marketing and its 
impact on motivating influencers and companies to engage in deceptive con-
duct.  Part III provides insight into the FTC’s authority to regulate influenc-
ers and its guides concerning disclosure.  Part IV demonstrates that the 
FTC’s enforcement mechanisms are useless against violators without imple-
mentation of fundamental changes.  Part V argues that the FTC should use 
its rulemaking authority to deem failed disclosure an FTC Act violation and 
require that every contractual endorsement agreement with influencers in-
clude mandatory provisions respecting disclosure.  By choosing to regulate 
influencer marketing in this manner, the FTC would rectify its previous en-
forcement failures, thereby aiding consumers in accurately assessing en-
dorsed content.19 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INFLUENCER MARKETING AND THE CURRENT 
INCENTIVE TO ENGAGE IN DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 
In the twenty-first century, the influencer marketing industry continues 
to proliferate year after year.20  The estimated influencer marketing growth 
for 2020 is $9.7 billion, an increase of $8 billion from 2016.21  A vast major-
ity of companies now create standalone budgets dedicated to the content-
based marketing method.22  While the media often criticizes the sincerity of 
influencers, there is no question that the influencer marketing industry is a 
“highly popular and effective form of marketing.”23  Nevertheless, as influ-
encer marketing continues to grow, so does the concern over the growth of 
deceptive business practices.24 
                                                          
19. See generally DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note 11.  
20. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, INFLUENCER 
MARKETINGHUB, https://influencermarketinghub.com/influencer-marketing-benchmark-report-
2020/ (last updated Mar. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KJ55-DQQF].  
21. See id.  
 22. Influencer marketing relies on influencers to generate content on their social media 
platforms.  See id.  
23. See id.  
24. See id.  
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A. The Brief History of Early Influencer Marketing 
Contrary to the common misconception, influencer marketing predates 
the twentieth century.25  Although the marketing method is not a new inven-
tion, the term “influencer” has recently gained traction and was officially 
added to the English dictionary in 2019.26  One of the first influencer collab-
orations was between a potter named Josiah Wedgwood and Queen Charlotte 
of England in 1760.27  The “forward-thinking” potter created a tea set for the 
Queen and marketed it as “Royal-approved,” cementing the brand with the 
luxurious status that it still holds to this day.28  Monarchs dominated the in-
fluencer status during this period in British history, but in the modern era, 
celebrities too became entrusted with the power to influence.29 
In 1984, Nike, an athletic shoe company, took a gamble on a young 
basketball player by spending nearly all of its shoe marketing budget to cre-
ate a new signature shoe line that would cement the rookie player as the orig-
inal “signature shoe king.”30  Labeled as a “once-in-a-generation athlete,” 
Michael Jordan not only became a household name in the sports world but 
also a famous cultural icon.31  Nike’s bet ultimately paid off.  To illustrate, 
the Jordan brand made billions of dollars in profits in the 2019 fiscal year.32  
Consumers worldwide spend their hard-earned capital for even the slightest 
                                                          
25. See Aaron Brooks, [Timeline] A Brief History of Influencers, SOCIALMEDIATODAY 
(May 9, 2019), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/timeline-a-brief-history-of-influencers
/554377/ [https://perma.cc/AB27-SYF5].  
26. See id.  
27. See id.  
28. See id.   
29. See id.  
 30. See Ronald D. White, How Michael Jordan Became a Brand, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14, 
2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-ig-michael-jordan-jordan-brand-sneakers-
sneaker-20190214-story.html [https://archive.is/gvKLX].  
31. See id.  
32. See Kurt Badenhausen, How Michael Jordan Will Make $145 Million in 2019, FORBES 
(Aug. 28, 2019, 8:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2019/08/28/how-mi-
chael-jordan-will-make-145-million-in-2019/#6391d5631064 [http://archive.today/1x3tP].  
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chance to play like “the guy who could fly” on the basketball court.33  As a 
testament to the brand’s success, although Michael Jordan retired in 2003, 
he still commands influence over consumer purchases because his persona 
and name brand are synonymous with greatness.34  Celebrities, in addition 
to star athletes, remain highly sought after for their reach and ability to con-
nect with younger generations.35  As social media platforms continue to gar-
ner mass popularity in recent years, the influencer market has evolved, be-
coming more prevalent, and enabled almost anyone to become an 
influencer.36 
B. How the Modern Incarnation of Influencer Marketing Practices 
Paves the Way for Fraudulent Business Practices 
As society becomes overly dependent on technology in the twenty-first 
century,37 the internet has become a center for individuals to create a profit-
able business by influencing others across their designated social media pro-
files.38  Social media has progressed beyond the mere function of communi-
cation by converging with e-commerce, whereby companies turn to 
influencers as prominent figures to market their products.39  Social media 
platforms like Instagram and TikTok are becoming a primary method for 
                                                          
33. See White, supra note 30.  
34. See Scott Davis et al., Most Americans Think Michael Jordan is the ‘GOAT’ over Leb-
ron James, and It’s Not Even Close, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:38 PM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/jordan-lebron-goat-debate-americans-jordan-2019-3 [https://perma.cc/3NEE-
5E5B].  
35. See generally Georgia Hatton, Micro Influencers vs Macro Influencers, 
SOCIALMEDIATODAY (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/micro-influenc-
ers-vs-macro-influencers/516896/ [https://perma.cc/WP4W-DGGJ].  
36. See Brooks, supra note 25.   
 37. See Marguerite Darlington, This is What Digital Addiction Looks Like, REWIRE (Dec. 
12, 2017), https://www.rewire.org/digital-addiction/ [https://perma.cc/CH7P-5RJQ].  
38. See Shane Barker, How to Make Money on Social Media as an Influencer, SHANE 
BARKER (Mar. 31, 2020), https://shanebarker.com/blog/influencer-make-big-money-on-social-
media/ [https://perma.cc/8RX7-GACT].  
39. See Audrey Schomer, Influencer Marketing: State of the Social Media Influencer Mar-
ket in 2020, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2019, 7:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/influencer-
marketing-report [https://perma.cc/HYB4-TNFS].  
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companies to connect with younger generations of consumers.40  Moreover, 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to find a brand that does not implement 
an influencer marketing campaign on Instagram.41  Because of its success, 
influencer marketing is now a typical expense on a company’s balance 
sheet.42  By the year 2022, companies are set to spend upwards of $15 billion 
on influencer marketing.43  While there are many monetary benefits that 
await those who venture into the realm of influencer marketing,44 it is crucial 
to first gain insight into the marketing method’s pay-for-endorsement struc-
ture to understand the negative connotations it implicitly invokes. 
Before embarking on an influencer marketing journey, companies must 
consider a host of factors to determine how to reach the right target audi-
ence.45  While not an exhaustive list, many companies consider the following 
factors in selecting an influencer: social media platform, influencer follow-
ing, engagement rates, market category, content format, campaign delivera-
bles, exclusivity, and production costs.46  Influencers, too, consider these 
factors when electing to build a business around their respective follow-
ings.47  These influencers selectively tailor their content using factors they 
believe companies prioritize, which empowers influencers to “charge in a 
manner similar to any business offering a service.”48 
Since influencer marketing is a service-oriented industry, influencers 
are frequently segmented into a tiered system based on their social media 
followings.49  Using a tiered system, marketers can paint a picture of the 
                                                          
40. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.  
41. See generally id.  
42. See generally id.  
43. See Schomer, supra note 39.  
44. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.  
45. See Influencer Rates: How Much Do Influencers Charge?, MEDIAKIX, https://media-
kix.com/blog/influencer-rates/ [https://perma.cc/4XUF-ZVXF].  
46. See id.  
47. See id.  
48. See id. 
49. See id.  
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estimated costs for electing to retain a particular type of influencer.50  At the 
bottom tier are nano-influencers who are like most of the general population 
without celebrity-like status, have follower counts of less than ten thousand, 
and generally receive free products or monetary compensation up to $500 
for each endorsed post.51  While compensation in this tier seems quite mi-
nuscule, nano-influencers can earn anywhere between $30,000 to $60,000 
per year.52  Next are micro-influencers who have followings of ten to fifty 
thousand accounts and can charge companies anywhere from $200 to $4,000 
per post,53 making $40,000 to $100,000 annually.54  Macro-influencers are 
one tier above micro-influencers and have a following of five hundred thou-
sand to one million accounts, which allows them to demand compensation 
of $5,000 to $25,000 per post.55  Lastly, a mega-influencer is in the highest 
tier, eclipsing the compensation that macro-influencers receive while having 
a following of over a one million accounts.56  Within the mega-influencer 
tier, which often includes celebrities, are individuals who can command 
compensation of more than $500,000 per post.57 
As influencer marketing has exploded from its infancy on social media, 
its landscape has continued to evolve.58  In the past decade, companies have 
diverted away from securing the traditional type of influencer.59  Companies 
                                                          
50. See id.  
51. See id.  
52. See Audrey Conklin, How Much Money Do Social Media Influencers Make?, 
FOXBUSINESS (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/social-media-influencer-
pay [https://perma.cc/5LBQ-CWBU].  
53. See Influencer Rates, supra note 45.  
54. See Conklin, supra note 52.  
55. See Influencer Rates, supra note 45.  
56. See id.  
57. See id.; see also Conklin, supra note 52. 
58. See Influencer Rates, supra note 45.  
59. See Megan DeGruttola, Why the Future of Influencer Marketing Will Be Organic Influ-
encers, SOCIALMEDIATODAY (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/why-the-
future-of-influencer-marketing-will-be-organic-influencers/567463/ [https://perma.cc/BC25-
ANFD].  
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used to select traditional influencers such as celebrities or individuals with a 
high number of followers based on the belief that consumers would purchase 
more of their products or services.60  Much to the dismay of these companies, 
while “traditional influencers may have been able to deliver the initial eye-
balls,” research has demonstrated that high viewership does not equate to a 
higher purchase rate by the consumer.61  To illustrate, “many people follow 
mega-influencers and celebrities, they often do so, simply because they rec-
ognize the name, rather than for any great interest in the topic of [their] 
posts.”62   
Moreover, due to an oversaturated industry and barrage of high-profile 
scandals, the general public is gradually losing the trust they once placed in 
mega and celebrity influencers.63  Consequently, the current trend followed 
by companies is to secure nano or micro influencers rather than their mega 
or celebrity counterparts.64  However, there are drawbacks to this modern 
trend.  The FTC has limited resources, making it inefficient to police the 
thousands of nano or micro influencers who have little notoriety aside from 
their small followings.65 
C. Influencer Marketing’s Contractual Nature is the Culprit for 
Encouraging Deceptive Behavior 
As the general population becomes less inclined to respond to tradi-
tional marketing methods, influencer marketing has growing exponen-
tially.66  The current generation is deeply persuaded by advertising and 
                                                          
60. See generally id.  
61. See id.; see also The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 
20.  
62. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.  
63. See DeGruttola, supra note 59.  
64. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.  
65. The FTC is an agency with finite resources, making it selective in pursuing violators 
who have a greater following of accounts to set an example.  See Laura E. Bladow, Worth the Click: 
Why Greater FTC Enforcement Is Needed to Curtail Deceptive Practices in Influencer Marketing, 
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1141 (2018).  
66. See generally DeGruttola, supra note 59.  
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promotional content that radiates an authentic yet creative feel.67  In order to 
appeal to these unique desires, marketers have turned to influencers to create 
“high-quality content that fits within their brand aesthetic” and fulfills that 
authentic appeal.68  However, authentic content becomes eerily suspicious if 
one considers “that the minute you pay someone for content, it becomes in-
herently inauthentic.”69 
Influence is successful when it is premised on credibility, but can be 
corrupted if it is based on deception.70  While this may seem intuitive, many 
consumers do not realize that deception is inherent in the contractual nature 
of influencer marketing.71  When individuals are contractually obligated to 
repeatedly mention a product or company or post promotional content of a 
company on their respective social media accounts, they cease to be influ-
encers.72  Instead, the influencer functions as an online “mercenary,” an in-
dividual who will post promotional content for the right price or material 
benefit.73  Inadvertently, a sliver of marketing that was intended to establish 
an authentic connection is replaced with individuals who are simply “walk-
ing advertisement[s].”74  A recurring theme in influencer marketing “is to 
deceive, to make believe that a recommendation is genuine and to hide the 
fact that there is a contract.”75 
A series of scandals reveal the underlying problems with the influencer 
marketing model.76  If brands “stipulate how often an influencer has to 
                                                          
67. See id.  
68. See id.  
69. See id.  
70. See Enrique Dans, Influencer Marketing: A Phony Industry Based on False Premises, 
FORBES (July 17, 2019, 6:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2019/07/17/influ-
encer-marketing-a-phony-industry-based-on-falsepremises/#b4fcf5460d6b [http://archive.today
/rjRGO].  
71. See id.  
72. See id.  
73. See id.  
74. See id.  
75. See id.  
 76. See DeGruttola, supra note 59.  See also Kaya Yurieff, Instagram Star Isn’t What She 
Seems. But Brands are Buying In, CNN BUS. (June 25, 2018, 11:23 AM), https://money.cnn.com
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mention [the] brand and where and when, while . . . [hoping] he or she [does 
not] do something disastrous,” authenticity becomes but a mere fable.77  For 
instance, Bootea, a detox tea company, engaged celebrity influencer Scott 
Disick to market its tea products using his Instagram platform to reach target 
audiences.78  However, due to the degree of control Bootea maintained over 
his social media posts and Disick’s failure to act diligently, Disick acci-
dentally copied and pasted the company’s directions into his post, including 
the time to post and the pre-written caption drafted by the company.79  Dis-
ick’s mishap unintentionally alerted the public to the contractual nature be-
hind his decision to post the content, thereby exposing the deception behind 
their relationship.80 
Consumers are not the only parties who experience the shortcomings 
of a marketing method that idolizes individuals who allegedly have influ-
ence.81  Companies must grapple with the fact that “social networks are filled 
with imaginary people whose followers, likes and comments are paid for and 
who have absolutely zero influence.”82  The desire to secure a lucrative con-
tract through the appearance of authenticity and a large following has incen-
tivized influencers “[t]o appear more influential than they actually are” by 
inflating their online presence with purchased fake followers.83  CNBC re-
ported that the fraudulent activity of buying fake followers to “like” or com-
ment on social media posts cost advertisers an estimated $1.3 billion in 
                                                          
/2018/06/25/technology/lil-miquela-social-media-influencer-cgi/index.html?sr=liCNN062518lil-
miquela-social-media-influencer-cgi0144PMStory.cgi/index.html?sr=liCNN062518lil-miquela-
social-media-influencer-cgi0144PMStory [https://perma.cc/5MPV-DD4T]; Conklin, supra note 
52.  
77. Dans, supra note 70.  
78. See Hatton, supra note 35.  
79. See id.  
80. See id.  
81. See generally Dans, supra note 70; DeGruttola, supra note 59. 
 82. Dans, supra note 70. 
 83. Megan Graham, Fake Followers in Influencer Marketing Will Cost $1.3 Billion This 
Year, Report Says, CNBC (July 24, 2019, 1:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/24/fake-fol-
lowers-in-influencer-marketing-will-cost-1point3-billion-in-2019.html [https://perma.cc/ZV7X-
G2EJ].  
COOPER_MACROS_V5 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2021  12:03 PM 
2021] INFLUENCERS 89 
2019.84  The fraudulent practice was so profitable that an American company 
named Devumi was able to earn millions of dollars by selling followers “to 
celebrities, businesses and anyone who wants to appear more popular or ex-
ert influence online.”85  As companies and consumers grow increasingly con-
cerned over influencer fraud due to deceptive behavior influencers routinely 
employ, 86 the FTC must strike at the heart of influencer marketing by mak-
ing disclosure a required element in every influencer-company endorsement 
contract.87 
III. THE FTC’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INFLUENCER MARKETING 
AND THE USE OF ITS ENDORSEMENT GUIDES TO PROVIDE 
INSTRUCTION ON ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE 
The FTC is an independent agency of the United States government 
dedicated to protecting the rights of consumers.88  The agency’s mission has 
long been “to stop deceptive ads,” which include endorsements made 
through a designated social media platform.89  The FTC periodically pro-
vides tips and instructions on how to comply with relevant laws.90  Before 
discussing the disclosure requirements that influencers must follow, it is nec-
essary to describe the FTC’s scope of regulatory authority, which ultimately 
gave rise to the FTC’s Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Tes-
timonials in Advertising (“Endorsement Guides”). 
A. The Establishment of the FTC’s Power to Regulate the Unfair 
                                                          
84. See id.  
85. Nicholas Confessore et al., The Follower Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html [https://perma.cc
/X5H6-JZNH].  
86. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.  
87. See infra Part V. 
 88. See Sorilbran Stone, The New FTC Regulations For Influencer Marketing, THE SHELF 
(July 6, 2017), https://www.theshelf.com/the-blog/ftc-influencer-disclosure-rules [https://perma.cc
/B7FM-JP3C]. 
89. See DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note 11. 
90. See id. 
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and Deceptive Practices Utilized in Influencer Marketing 
The FTC Act grants the FTC broad powers to prohibit “persons, part-
nerships, or corporations” from engaging in “unfair” or “deceptive” practices 
that affect commerce.91  An act or practice is considered “unfair” if it “causes 
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.”92  The FTC Act does not define 
“deceptive acts or practices,”93 but the FTC has issued a policy statement 
providing guidance on the term “deception.”94  In the policy statement, the 
FTC defines deception as “a representation, omission or practice that is likely 
to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the con-
sumer’s detriment.”95  More importantly, an omission is deceptive “when 
qualifying information necessary to prevent a practice, claim, representation, 
or reasonable expectation or belief from being misleading is not disclosed.”96 
Not all deceptive omissions are actionable.97  The omission in question 
must be material, meaning that “consumers are likely to have chosen differ-
ently but for the deception.”98  The test applied by the FTC is “whether the 
consumer’s interpretation or reaction is reasonable” in light of the claim be-
ing brought.99  An interpretation may be reasonable even if not shared by a 
majority of the relevant class; rather, a deceptive act needs only to “[mislead] 
                                                          
 91. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018).  
92. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  
93. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(A). 
 94.  See Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to the Honorable 
John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 
14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on Deception], available at https://www.ftc.gov/sys-
tem/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5NWJ-XE9B]. 
 95. Id. 
96. Id.  
97. Omissions that are not material are not actionable.  See id.   
98. Id. 
99. Id.  
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a significant minority of reasonable consumers.”100  Courts have interpreted 
a “significant minority” as slightly above or precisely ten percent of affected 
reasonable consumers.101 
In its mission to prevent deceptive practices, the FTC may exercise its 
rulemaking authority to prescribe two different sets of rules, each having its 
own implications.102  First, the FTC may furnish “interpretive rules and gen-
eral statements of policy” to provide guidance on avoiding conduct that 
amounts “to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce.”103  Interpretative rules are more akin to guidelines and do not carry 
the weight of law, meaning violators will not be subject to civil penalties or 
consumer redress under the FTC Act’s Section 5 and Section 19, respec-
tively.104  Second, the FTC can issue “rules which define with specificity 
[the] acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”105  Unlike interpretative rules, these defined rules 
function as formal rules of law, granting the FTC the discretion to pursue 
civil penalties and consumer redress against violators.106  The framework of 
the Endorsement Guides, which articulate the disclosure requirements for 
both influencers and the companies that contract with influencers, is the em-
bodiment of the FTC’s interpretative rule promulgation designed to prevent 
                                                          
100. Id.  
101. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (affirming 
a finding of deception where an ad misleads at least ten percent of the purchasing public); see also 
FTC v. John Beck Amazing Profits, LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1070-71 n.88 (C.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“10.5% to 17.3% . . . is sufficient to prove the complaint allegation that the challenged represen-
tation had been made.”).  
102. See Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2018); see also A 
Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://
perma.cc/W74N-PQP5].  
103. 15 U.S.C. § 57a.  
104. The FTC may pursue a civil action for civil penalties or consumer redress when an 
individual violates a rule “other than an interpretive rule.”  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m), 57b. 
105. 15 U.S.C. § 57a.  See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investiga-
tive and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102. 
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m), 57b.  See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.  
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deceptive behavior in influencer marketing.107  However, since they are in-
terpretative guides and not formal rules,108 they serve a weak function to fur-
ther the FTC’s mission. 
B. The Framework of the FTC’s Disclosure Requirement: An 
Attempt at Preventing Influencers and Companies from Acting 
Deceptive with Endorsements 
The FTC realizes that “[e]ndorsements are an important tool for adver-
tisers and they can be persuasive to consumers” but can also be “misleading 
if they are not accompanied by information describing what consumers can 
generally expect from use of the product or service.”109  To prevent mislead-
ing consumers, the FTC issued its Endorsement Guides to demonstrate that 
influencer marketing is subject to the same truthful advertising laws that ap-
ply to other forms of advertising.110  In particular, the Endorsement Guides 
seek to link “the application of Section 5 of the FTC Act . . . to the use of 
endorsements and testimonials in [influencer marketing].”111  The Endorse-
ment Guides are not conclusive on “whether the law has been violated.”112  
Consequently, “there are no civil penalties associated with [violating] them. 
But if advertisers fail to comply, “the FTC may decide to investigate whether 
the practices are unfair or deceptive under the FTC Act.”113 
Compliance with the Endorsement Guides is not mandatory; rather, 
they provide influencers and companies with the information necessary to 
voluntarily comply with the law.114  For purposes of enforcing the FTC Act, 
                                                          
107. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2020).  
108. See id.; see also Advertisement Endorsements, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-advertising/advertisement-endorsements 
[https://perma.cc/S7EF-FAV9]. 
109. Advertisement Endorsements, supra note 108.  
110. See id. 
 111. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0.  
112. Bladow, supra note 65, at 1135 n.97 (citations omitted).  
113.  Advertisement Endorsements, supra note 108. 
114. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0.  
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the FTC treats endorsements and testimonials identically.115  The FTC de-
fines endorsement as: 
 
[A]ny advertising message (including verbal statements, demon-
strations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other 
identifying personal characteristics of an individual or the name 
or seal of an organization) that consumers are likely to believe 
reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party 
other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views expressed 
by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser. 
The party whose opinions, beliefs, findings, or experience the 
message appears to reflect will be called the endorser and may be 
an individual, group, or institution.116 
 
When making an endorsement, the endorser’s message “must reflect the hon-
est opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.”117  Accord-
ingly, consumer endorsements do not serve as “competent and reliable sci-
entific evidence.”118 
The Endorsement Guides require full disclosure of “a connection be-
tween the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that might mate-
rially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement.”119  A “material 
connection” to a seller or brand includes “a personal, family, or employment 
relationship or a financial relationship – such as the brand paying you or 
giving you free or discounted products or services.”120  In complying with 
the Endorsement Guides, a disclosure must “clearly and conspicuously” 
place consumers on notice that they are viewing an endorsement.121  Because 
                                                          
115. While not formally defined in the statute, testimonials are statements that an individual 
makes regarding the benefits of a product or service he or she used.  See id. 
116. Id. (emphasis added).  
117. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a).  
118. 16 C.F.R. § 255.2. 
119. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.  
120. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0; DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note 
11, at 2.  
121. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.  
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the Endorsement Guides do not define the degree of disclosure required,122 
the FTC has supplied supplemental guides that provide clarification.123  “In 
evaluating whether a disclosure is likely to be clear and conspicuous, adver-
tisers should consider its placement in the ad and its proximity to the relevant 
claim. The closer the disclosure is to the claim to which it relates, the bet-
ter.”124  Additionally, other important considerations include: 
 
[T]he prominence of the disclosure; whether it is unavoidable; 
whether other parts of the ad distract attention from the disclosure; 
whether the disclosure needs to be repeated at different places on 
a website; whether disclosures in audio messages are presented in 
an adequate volume and cadence; whether visual disclosures ap-
pear for a sufficient duration; and whether the language of the dis-
closure is understandable to the intended audience.125 
 
The FTC also emphasizes that “[d]isclosures must be effectively communi-
cated to consumers before they make a purchase or incur a financial obliga-
tion.”126  These principles are highly adaptable and meant to be implemented 
across almost any platform.127  Nevertheless, if a designated “platform does 
not provide an opportunity to make clear and conspicuous disclosures, then 
that platform should not be used to disseminate advertisements that require 
[such] disclosures.”128 
The FTC emphasizes that advertisers should perceive their advertise-
ments from a reasonable consumer’s perspective.129  In determining whether 
an advertisement is misleading, the “key is the overall net impression” in the 
                                                          
122. See id.  
123. See .Com Disclosures: How to Make Effective Disclosures in Digital Advertising, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, (Mar. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus41-
dot-com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJC9-JJGW]. 
124. Id. at i.  
125. Id. at i-ii.  
126. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).  
127. See id. at i.  
128. Id. at iii.  
129. See id. at 6.  
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eyes of a consumer.130  As such, it is the influencer’s “responsibility to make 
these disclosures, to be familiar with the Endorsement Guides, and to comply 
with laws against deceptive ads.”131  Adequate disclosure “will depend on 
the specific factual circumstances,” or put more simply, a case-by-case ba-
sis.132  “Liability as an endorser turns on whether a consumer would reason-
ably attribute the views, opinions, or beliefs expressed as personal to the 
speaker or merely as those of the sponsoring advertiser.”133  Despite the spec-
ificity of the FTC’s disclosure requirements, liability is seldomly imposed 
by the FTC, resulting in a plethora of influencers that avoid liability even 
after failing to comply.134  Without formal rules that impose civil penalties, 
voluntary compliance is insufficient to remedy this deceptive behavior.135 
IV. THE FTC’S ENFORCEMENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST INFLUENCERS 
WHO FAIL TO DISCLOSE AND ITS INABILITY TO DETER THE DECEPTIVE 
BEHAVIOR 
Before 2015, influencer marketing was in its infancy compared to the 
billion-dollar industry it has become today.136  However, by the beginning of 
2015, influencer marketing began gaining traction.137  At the time, “brands 
were really just starting to test ads on the platform to see if the FTC was 
really paying attention.”138  Shortly thereafter, it became increasingly clear 
to brands that it was lucrative to leverage social media to market their 
                                                          
130. Id. 
 131. DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note 11. 
 132. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a) (2020).  
 133. FTC v. Garvey, NO. CV 00-9358 (GAF)(CWx), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25060, at *18 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2001). 
134. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20 (“If 
influencers don’t improve their performance soon, there is a real danger that the FTC . . . will start 
prosecuting rather than just warning and educating.”).  
135. See infra Part IV.  
136. See generally Stone, supra note 88.  
137. See id.  
138. Id. 
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products and services to consumers.139  As companies started to strategize 
for creative ways to connect with “people using social media for their per-
sonal and professional lives,” a pressing need arose to “ensure there are rules 
in place to level the playing field between brands, influencers, and consum-
ers.”140  The FTC attempted to fill the void, investigating and pursuing 
“brands, influencers, and consumers” that did not play by the rules.141 
A. An Examination of the FTC’s Enforcement Campaign Against 
Federal Trade Commission Act Violators 
The FTC “may initiate an enforcement action using either an adminis-
trative or judicial process if it has ‘reason to believe’ that the law is being or 
has been violated.”142  The Commission’s principal motive for bringing an 
enforcement action is to deter a violator from engaging in the same conduct 
in the future.143  As the first step in an enforcement action, the FTC issues a 
complaint setting forth the charges it has reason to believe the respondent 
violated.144  If the respondent accepts the charges and “elects to settle [the 
them], it may sign a consent agreement (without admitting liability), consent 
to entry of a final order, and waive all right to judicial review.”145  “If the 
respondent elects to contest the charges, the complaint is adjudicated before 
an administrative law judge . . . in a trial-type proceeding.”146  After the 
                                                          
139. See id.  
140. Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforce-
ment Authority, supra note 102 (emphasis added).  
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed 
to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using . . . unfair or deceptive acts”) (em-
phasis added).  
144. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law En-
forcement Authority, supra note 102.  
145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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hearing concludes, the administrative law judge will recommend that the 
FTC either enter an order to cease and desist or dismiss the complaint.147 
Generally, no civil penalties are issued against violators unless a re-
spondent violates the FTC’s final order issued in an enforcement proceeding, 
or a non-respondent knowingly violates either the FTC Act or a FTC final 
cease and desist order.148  The latter requires that the violator have “actual 
knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circum-
stances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule.”149  
Each violation will result in a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per offense, and 
depending on the type of offense, may also warrant injunctive and other eq-
uitable relief.150  Additionally, the FTC may seek remedial damages, and 
other types of relief against violators of the FTC Act or a FTC final cease 
and desist order as a remedial measure for consumer injury.151  However, the 
FTC cannot seek damages or other relief in issuing a final cease and desist 
order against a violator unless it can show that the violation related to con-
duct “which a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances 
was dishonest or fraudulent.”152 
If the FTC is successful in satisfying this requirement, additional relief 
imposed “may include, but shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation 
of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, [and] the payment of 
damages.”153  The FTC cannot unilaterally obtain civil penalties or consumer 
redress against violators.154  Rather, the FTC must seek “judicial 
                                                          
 147. See id.  
 148. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m); see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.  
149. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m).  
150. See U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m); see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.  
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b; see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.  
152. 15 U.S.C. § 57b; see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Inves-
tigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102. 
 153. 15 U.S.C. § 57b.  
 154. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m); see also 15 U.S.C. § 57b; A Brief Overview of the Federal 
Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 102.  
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enforcement” from any federal district court that the FTC Act empowered to 
grant such relief.155  Nevertheless, the FTC will remain powerless, effec-
tively unable to seek civil penalties or consumer redress, until it deems failed 
influencer disclosure an unfair or deceptive act. 
B. The FTC’s Enforcement Actions Serve as Educational Lessons 
Rather than a Deterrence to Influencers and Companies from 
Violating the Federal Trade Commission Act 
When brands were just starting to test the uncharted waters by placing 
ads on the social media platforms,156 one of the first brands to use influencer 
marketing and catch the eye of the FTC was fashion clothing brand icon Lord 
& Taylor, LLC (“Lord & Taylor”).157 The clothing brand launched an Insta-
gram campaign in 2014, which gave rise to conduct that drove the FTC to 
serve Lord & Taylor with a complaint in 2016.158  The campaign “comprised 
of Lord & Taylor-branded blog posts, photos, video uploads, native adver-
tising editorials in online fashion magazines, and use of a team of fashion 
influencers recruited for their fashion style and extensive base of followers 
on social media platforms.”159  Each of the fifty selected fashion influencers 
were paid compensation ranging from $1,000 to $4,000.160  The influencers 
were given creative freedom to style their post wearing a specific Lord & 
Taylor dress, but were contractually obligated to “exclusively mention” the 
company using hashtags and photo tags.161 
Although Lord & Taylor’s contractual agreement with the influencers 
gave detailed instructions on how to mention the company in their posted 
                                                          
155.  A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforce-
ment Authority, supra note 102 (“[T]he Commission must still seek the aid of a court to obtain civil 
penalties or consumer redress for violations”); 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m); see also 15 U.S.C. § 57b. 
 156. See Stone, supra note 88.  
157. See Complaint, In re Lord & Taylor LLC, No. C-4576 (F.T.C. May 20, 2016) [here-
inafter Lord & Taylor Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/160523lordtaylorcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BB9-C75W].  
158. Id. at 1. 
 159. Id.  
160. Id. at 2.  
161. Id.  
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content, the contract did not require these influencers to disclose their mate-
rial connection to Lord & Taylor.162  The Instagram campaign was a success, 
reaching over 11.4 million individual Instagram users,163  and resulted in the 
dress selling out.164  In response to the failed disclosure, the FTC ordered 
that Lord & Taylor “not misrepresent, in any manner, expressly or by impli-
cation, that an endorser of such product or service is an independent user or 
ordinary consumer of the product or service.”165  Further, the FTC ordered 
Lord & Taylor “shall clearly and conspicuously, and in close proximity to 
the representation, disclose a material connection, if one exists, between such 
endorser and [Lord & Taylor].”166  Yet, the FTC’s Decision and Order did 
not impose any form of civil penalties,167 nor did the FTC pursue any of the 
influencers involved.168 
After wrapping up its enforcement action with Lord & Taylor, the FTC 
set its sights on another prominent company, Warner Bros. Home Entertain-
ment Inc. (“WBHE”).169  The deceptive conduct related to the WBHE action 
dated back to 2014, however, the liability WBHE faced was due to the con-
duct of Warner Bros. Interactive Entertainment (“WBIE”), a division of 
WBHE.170  Before the release of the video game titled, Middle Earth: 
Shadow of Mordor (“Shadow of Mordor”), WBIE hired an advertising 
                                                          
162. Id.  
163. Id.  
164. Id. 
165. Decision and Order at 3, In re Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576 (F.T.C. May 20, 
2016) [hereinafter Lord & Taylor Order], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/cases/160523lordtaylordo.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7XF-4YN5]. 
 166.  Id. at 4.  
167. See id.  
168. The FTC opted to pursue Lord & Taylor rather than spend its time and resources tar-
geting individual influencers.  See Wendy Davis, FTC to Review Influencer Marketing, 
MEDIAPOST (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/347001/ftc-to-re-
view-influencer-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/6D2K-BTM3].  See generally Lord & Taylor 
Complaint, supra note 157, at 1.  
 169. See Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17.  
170. Id. at 1. 
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agency to coordinate a YouTube Influencer Campaign.171  The agency se-
cured influencers with impressive reputations in both the gaming and 
YouTube communities to post positive reviews of the game on their 
YouTube channels.172  These reviews were in direct conflict with FTC’s En-
dorsement Guides, which state that “[e]ndorsements must reflect the honest 
opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.”173  While the 
agency that secured the influencers did provide instruction to the influencers 
to place visible sponsorship disclosures “above the fold” in the description 
box, most did not comply, either placing the disclosure out of sight “below 
the line” or in another inadequate manner.174 
In this instance, the YouTube influencers received a pre-release version 
of Shadow of Mordor and a cash payment ranging from a couple hundred to 
tens of thousands of dollars.175  The FTC did find that on at least two occa-
sions, influencers made disclosures that they received free access to the 
game.176  Nevertheless, the disclosure was hardly adequate for the FTC’s 
purposes since they omitted that monetary compensation was also re-
ceived.177  The YouTube influencers posted over thirty gameplay videos on 
YouTube, which were viewed over 5.5 million times by consumers.178  To 
deter the violating conduct, the FTC ordered both WBHE and WBIE to 
“[c]learly and [c]onspicuously disclose a [m]aterial [c]onnection” in any fu-
ture influencer campaign.179  Again, no implementation of civil penalties 
                                                          
 171. Id.  
172. Id.  
173. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (2020); see also Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17, at 3 
(“In truth and in fact, these gameplay videos of Shadow of Mordor do not reflect the independent 
opinions or experiences of impartial video game enthusiasts.”). 
 174. See Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17, at 2–3.  
175. Id. at 1–2.  
176. Id. at 3.  
177. Id.  
178. Id.  
 179. Decision and Order at 3, In re Warner Bros. Home Entm’t Inc., No. C-4595 (F.T.C. 
Nov. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Warner Bros. Order], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/cases/161811warner_bros_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB3H-8Z5J].  
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were included in the FTC’s Decision and Order, nor were any charges 
brought against the influencers involved.180 
Until 2017, influencers roamed social media platforms largely free 
from any legal consequences.181  During this period, the FTC reviewed “In-
stagram posts by celebrities, athletes, and other influencers” and found they 
did not comply with the FTC’s guidelines.182  In response to this finding, the 
FTC “sent out more than 90 letters reminding influencers and marketers that 
influencers should clearly and conspicuously disclose their relationships to 
brands when promoting or endorsing products through social media.”183  
This action marked the first time that the FTC reached out directly to educate 
social media influencers.184  The letters served as a warning that the Endorse-
ment Guides are applicable to both influencers and marketers.185 
A wave of change occurred—or so many thought—on September 7, 
2017, when the FTC handed down its first-ever complaint against social me-
dia influencers.186  Trevor Martin and Thomas Cassell, also known respec-
tively by their social media monikers “TmarTn” and “Tom Syndicate,” en-
gaged in conduct that seemed deceptive in operating an online gambling 
website using their legal entity, CSGOLotto, Inc (“CGSO Lotto”).187  Both 
individuals were widely known in the gaming community and used their 
                                                          
180. See Warner Bros. Order, supra note 179; see also Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 
17.  
 181. See CSGO Lotto Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against Individual Social 
Media Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/09/csgo-lotto-owners-settle-ftcs-first-ever-complaint-against [https://perma.cc
/N788-H6BD]. 
 182. FTC Staff Reminds Influencers and Brands to Clearly Disclose Relationship, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/04/ftc-
staff-reminds-influencers-brands-clearly-disclose [https://perma.cc/P9FM-2J9X].  
 183. See id.  
184. See id.  
185. See id.  
186. See CSGO Lotto Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against Individual Social 
Media Influencers, supra note 181.  
187. See id.; see Complaint, In re CSGOLotto, Inc., No. C-4632 (F.T.C. Nov. 28, 2017) 
[hereinafter CSGO Lotto Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/cases/1623184_c-_csgolotto_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DTM-4F74]. 
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influence to profit from unsuspecting consumers who were unaware of their 
ownership interest in the website.188  Primarily, Martin and Cassell preyed 
on players of the online video game Counter-Strike: Global Offensive 
(“CSGO”) by encouraging gamers to use their “skins,” which are collectible 
game items that can be bought or sold for real-world money in order to gam-
ble on the influencers’ website while the influencers collected fees.189 
Each of the influencers created promotional videos on their respective 
YouTube channels showing themselves gambling on the site and providing 
tips on wining large sums of money.190  However, when it came to the re-
quired disclosures, “[n]owhere in his videos promoting CSGO Lotto or in 
the videos’ descriptions did Respondent Martin disclose that he was an of-
ficer and owner of the company operating CSGO Lotto or that he was gam-
bling with free skins provided by that company.”191  The influencers paid 
other influencers $2,500 to $55,000 to create posts describing their experi-
ences with the gambling website but prohibited them from saying anything 
that would disparage CSGO Lotto’s name.192  Similarly, these other influ-
encers also failed to disclose the contractual relationship with CSGO Lotto, 
but the FTC did not pursue them.193  Following the FTC’s precedent, the 
Commission ordered both Martin and Cassell to comply with the FTC’s dis-
closure requirements but did not impose any civil penalties.194  The FTC is-
sued corrective action in all three cases,195 but such actions were devoid of 
                                                          
 188. See CSGO Lotto Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against Individual Social 
Media Influencers, supra note 181, at 1; see also CSGO Lotto Complaint, supra note 187, at 2.  
 189. See CSGO Lotto Complaint, supra note 187, at 2.  
190. See id. at 2–3.  
191. Id. at 2.  
192. See id. at 4.  
193. See id. at 4-5.  
194. See Decision and Order, In re CSGO Lotto, Inc., No. C-4632 (F.T.C. Nov. 28, 2017) 
[hereinafter CSGO Lotto Order], available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/1623184_c-_csgolotto_decision_and_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JY5-36NE]. 
 195. See Lord & Taylor Complaint, supra note 157; Warner Bros. Order, supra note 179; 
CSGO Lotto Order, supra note 194.  
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any civil penalties or consumer redress that could be imposed because of one 
key detail: “[t]he Guides are not regulations.”196 
C. Unregulated: The Irony of an Enforcement Regime Without 
Influence Over an Industry that is Dependent on Influence 
Currently, influencer marketing has seemingly escaped the clutches of 
any imposed regulatory scheme, while fraudulent practices continue to be-
come more frequent.197  In response, some social networks have imple-
mented platform tools that make it easier for brands and influencers to post 
content in compliance with the FTC’s disclosure requirements.198  However, 
influencers still choose not to comply, and do so without facing any signifi-
cant consequences from the FTC.199  Even more concerning, Influencer Mar-
ketingHub, an organization that issues annual reports on the state of the in-
fluencer marketing industry, conducted a research project analyzing 1,000 
fashion micro-influencers posts for a month and found that only 14% com-
plied with the FTC guidelines.200  Failure to comply is not exclusive to mi-
cro- and nano-influencers; celebrities routinely fail to disclose their material 
relationship to a brand or company and are often rewarded with massive 
amounts of compensation.201 
Reflecting on the FTC’s past conduct, FTC Commissioner Rohit Cho-
pra recently stated, “I am concerned that companies paying for undisclosed 
influencer endorsements and reviews are not held fully accountable for this 
illegal activity.”202  He further stated, “[w]hile the FTC has pursued enforce-
ment actions against popular brands for disguising their advertising, it is not 
clear whether our actions are deterring misconduct in the marketplace, due 
                                                          
196.  Advertisement Endorsements, supra note 108. 
197. See Owens, supra note 15.  
198. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.  
199. See CSGO Lotto Order, supra note 194 (the FTC did not impose any sanctions for 
failing to disclose); see also Davis, supra note 168; Owens, supra note 15.  
200. See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report, supra note 20.  
201. See Shaw, supra note 7; see also Conklin, supra note 52. 
202. Davis, supra note 168.  
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to the limited sanctions we have pursued.”203  To date, it is widely believed 
that the FTC’s enforcement actions have been too lenient on companies and 
influencers involved in the deceptive conduct.204  Time after time, the FTC 
has settled these enforcement actions “for no customer refunds, no forfeiture 
of ill-gotten gains, no notice to consumers, no deletion of wrongfully ob-
tained personal data, and no findings or admission of liability.”205  Moreover, 
the FTC’s “punitive actions only represent a tiny portion of the ethical in-
fractions, illegal and otherwise, that are carried out within the influencer 
marketing world every day.”206  As influencer marketing remains “largely 
unregulated,” with fraud “becoming more rampant,”207 there still has been 
no action by the FTC to use its rulemaking authority to pass formal rules that 
regulate influencer marketing. 
V. PROPOSITION: IT IS TIME FOR THE FTC TO OVERHAUL THE 
INFLUENCER MARKETING INDUSTRY TO PROTECT CONSUMERS AND 
BUSINESSES 
To date, influencer marketing is left highly “unregulated” with industry 
players invoking their own self-regulatory schemes to prevent deceptive be-
havior, which are neither adequate nor in compliance with the FTC’s stand-
ards.208  “Studies have shown how reviews can lead to an increase in 
sales,”209 but the FTC continues to allow influencers and companies to 
                                                          
203. Id.  
204. See id.; See also Owens, supra note 15 (“In instances when it has targeted actual in-
fluencers, the FTC has mostly issued warning letters demanding they clean up their act.”).  
205. Davis, supra note 168.  
206. Owens, supra note 15.  
207. Id.  
 208. See id. (“[T]he [FTC] revealed that the disclosure tools that platforms like Facebook 
have put in place are not sufficient.”).  
209. Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding 
the Endorsement Guides Review, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/sys-
tem/files/documents/public_statements/1566445/p204500_-_endorsement_guides_reg_review_-
_chopra_stmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP74-4MJS].  
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escape liability for their actions.210  Accordingly, it is imperative that the 
FTC rise to the occasion and combat this “$8.2 billion ad fraud problem” by 
making the following two changes.211  First, the FTC must use its rulemaking 
authority to adopt formal rules from its disclosure provisions in the Endorse-
ment Guides.  Second, the FTC should regulate the influencer-company re-
lationship by requiring that certain provisions are present in every endorse-
ment contract. 
A. Going Beyond Guidance: The Use of the FTC’s Rulemaking 
Authority to Develop Stringent Rules that Actually Prevent Deceptive 
Behavior 
The FTC must first adopt certain provisions of the Endorsement Guides 
into formal rules.  Currently, the FTC’s Endorsement Guides serve as a sub-
stantial education tool for influencers and companies in its mission “to stop 
deceptive ads.”212  However, the Endorsement Guides’ inherent flaw is their 
unenforceability.213  To remedy this flaw, the Endorsement Guides should 
no longer be solely used as an education tool.  Instead, the FTC should codify 
certain aspects of the Endorsement Guides into formal rules that would ena-
ble the FTC to seek civil penalties, remedial damages, and other relief in 
accordance with the FTC Act.214  In particular, the FTC should, at a mini-
mum, adopt the disclosure provisions from the Endorsement Guides, deem-
ing it a violation of the FTC Act for failed compliance.  The disclosure pro-
visions state, “[w]hen there exists a connection between the endorser and the 
seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the weight or 
credibility of the endorsement material connection . . . such connection must 
                                                          
 210. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law En-
forcement Authority, supra note 102.  
211. Owens, supra note 15.  
212. DISCLOSURES 101 FOR SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS, supra note 11.  
213. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.1 (2020) (“The Guides provide the basis for voluntary compliance 
with the law by advertisers and endorsers.”) (emphasis added). 
214. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(l)–(m), 57b (2018); see also Dami Lee, The FTC is Cracking 
Down on Influencer Marketing on YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, VERGE (Feb. 12, 2020, 5:15 
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/12/21135183/ftc-influencer-ad-sponsored-tiktok-
youtube-instagram-review [https://archive.is/zAn2N].  
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be fully disclosed.”215  Moreover, the advertisement or endorsement should 
“clearly and conspicuously disclose either the payment or promise of com-
pensation prior to and in exchange for the endorsement” or that the endorser 
favored the advertised product for some material benefit.216 
By converting the disclosure provisions into formal rules, the FTC is 
validly exercising its rulemaking authority pursuant to section 18 of the FTC 
Act.217  While some may fear that the imposition of civil penalties may dis-
proportionately affect nano- or micro-influencers who often receive little 
compensation in exchange for their endorsements, this concern is alleviated 
given that district courts will consider several factors in determining the 
amount of the penalty.218  These factors include “the degree of culpability, 
any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue 
to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.”219  Critics may 
also question whether influencers who did not know about the disclosure 
requirements should face civil penalties for violating the newly adopted 
rules.  However, this concern is also mitigated.  The FTC Act contains a 
safeguard whereby the FTC must prove the influencer violated the rule with 
“actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective cir-
cumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such 
rule.”220 
Adopting the disclosure provisions into formal rules would provide the 
FTC with the tools to deter deceptive conduct.  For example, Thomas Cassell 
was not a first-time offender when he failed to disclose his ownership interest 
in the CSGO Lotto case.221  Cassell was involved in a prior FTC enforcement 
                                                          
 215. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (“[T]he Commission may prescribe . . . rules which define with 
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce”).  
218. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m). 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id.  
221. See Machinima Complaint, supra note 17, at 3; Lesley Fair, Three FTC Actions of 
Interest to Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 7, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://www.ftc.gov
/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/09/three-ftc-actions-interest-influencers [https://perma.cc
/HSA3-BMHJ]. 
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action against Machinima, Inc. (“Machinima”), where he was not sued, but 
the complaint did mention that “[n]owhere in the videos or in the videos’ 
descriptions did Cassell disclose that [Machinima] paid him to create and 
upload them.”222  If the disclosure provisions were formal rules, the FTC 
could have done more against Cassell, a repeat offender, when the FTC is-
sued the formal order to comply in the CSGO Lotto case.223  By being pre-
viously implicated in the FTC’s enforcement action against Machinima,224 
Cassell clearly had requisite knowledge in CSGO Lotto to be eligible for 
civil penalties under section 45 of the FTC Act.225  Moreover, his decision 
to hide his ownership interest while pocketing fees from unwitting consum-
ers would enable the FTC to pursue consumer redress pursuant to section 19, 
which includes “refund[ing] [consumer] money” and “pay[ing] damages.”226 
While the FTC never brought charges against any of the parties in-
volved in the Fyre Festival disaster,227 with newly adopted formal rules, the 
FTC could have pursued the influencers for consumer redress.228  Therefore, 
if the FTC is exhausted from settling its enforcement actions “for no cus-
tomer refunds, no forfeiture of ill-gotten gains, . . . and no findings or admis-
sion of liability,”229 it must codify the disclosure provisions into formal rules. 
B. Promulgating the Contractual Provisions that Govern an 
Influencer-Company Relationship 
To reinforce its decision to adopt the disclosure provisions into formal 
rules, the FTC should again use its rulemaking authority, specifying the pro-
visions that must be present in every influencer-company contract.  Contracts 
are the creation of a fundamental component that gives rise to the influencer-
                                                          
222. Machinima Complaint, supra note 17, at 3 (emphasis added).  
223. See CSGO Lotto Order, supra note 194, at 2.  
224. See Machinima Complaint, supra note 17, at 3; see also Fair, supra note 221. 
225. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (2018).  
226. 15 U.S.C. § 57b.  
 227. See Sun, supra note 13.  
228. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b (“The court . . . shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the 
court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers”) (emphasis added).  
229. Davis, supra note 168. 
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company endorsement relationship.230  Continuously, the FTC has stood idly 
while watching companies exploit this legally enforceable function to avoid 
appearing less than authentic.231  Since companies retain a vast amount of 
leverage when selecting the right influencer for its campaign,232 it is appro-
priate that the entity that drafts the contract must also include contractual 
provisions that mandate that influencers comply with the Endorsement 
Guides.  These contractual provisions should be modeled after the FTC’s 
“.com Disclosures” guide, which provides precise instructions on how to 
give “clear and conspicuous” disclosure in accordance with the Endorsement 
guides.233  Furthermore, the provisions should also include language that 
“[e]ndorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or expe-
rience of the endorser.”234  Additionally, as Federal Trade Commissioner 
Chopra stated, the FTC could provide “sample terms that companies can in-
clude in contracts.”235 
By using its rulemaking authority granted in section 18 of the FTC Act, 
the FTC could make it an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a company 
to fail to include provisions that provide instruction on giving adequate dis-
closure.236  Moreover, this is not the first time that the FTC has used this 
authority to govern the contractual relationship between two parties.237  For 
example, the FTC created the Credit Practices Rule, which affects consumer 
                                                          
 230. See generally Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17; Machinima Complaint, supra 
note 17, at 2.  
231. See Lee, supra note 214; Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 17, at 4; Machinima 
Complaint, supra note 17, at 5.  
 232. See Influencer Rates, supra note 45.  
 233. .Com Disclosures, supra note 123, at ii-iii.  
234. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1 (2020).  
235. See Chopra, supra note 209. 
236. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b (2018) (demonstrating that the FTC deemed it an unfair act or 
practice within the meaning of Section 5 of the FTC Act for creditor to take or receive certain 
contractual obligations).  
237. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2020); see also Complying with the Credit Practices Rule, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-credit-
practices-rule [https://perma.cc/HK7P-9TLB].  
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contracts by prohibiting the use of specific provisions.238  If a creditor does 
not comply with the Credit Practices Rule, the FTC can sue the violator in 
federal court for civil penalties.239  Similarly, with the new formal rules mod-
eled on the FTC’s guides, the FTC could seek civil penalties against a com-
pany in violation.240  Additionally, if an influencer were to fail to abide by 
the FTC’s required contractual provisions, companies could then disclaim 
liability by terminating the agreement and seeking recourse, a practice that 
companies have routinely employed with breaching influencers.241 
To date, the FTC continues to discover companies that provide inade-
quate or nonexistent instructions on giving adequate disclosure in compli-
ance with the FTC’s requirements.242  Moreover, such companies habitually 
direct the contracted endorser to review the company in a positive light.243  
There is nothing to indicate that these deceptive practices are slowing down.  
More recently, Sunday Riley Modern Skincare, LLC, a cosmetic company 
that sold its products through Sephora, was the subject of an FTC enforce-
ment action for instructing its employees to post fake positive reviews of its 
products.244  The company also provided instructions on masking their IP 
addresses and engaging in other questionable methods to avoid detection.245  
However, the FTC settled the matter without civil penalties and without the 
company admitting fault.246 
If the FTC is exhausted from not seeing changes in these types of be-
haviors, it must require certain provisions to be present in every influencer-
                                                          
238. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2; see also Complying with the Credit Practices Rule, supra note 
237.   
239. See Complying with the Credit Practices Rule, supra note 237.   
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m).  
 241. See Garson, supra note 2.   
242. See, e.g., Lord & Taylor Complaint, supra note 157, at 2.  
243. See Machinima Complaint, supra note 17, at 2 (“[Machinima] directed each influencer 
to include . . . Microsoft in a positive light”); see also Chopra, supra note 209. 
 244. See Cristina Miranda, Cosmetic Company Wrote Fake Reviews, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2019/10/cosmetic-company-wrote-fake-re-
views [https://perma.cc/YLZ6-CPAZ].  
245. Id.  
246. Id. 
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company contract.  No longer would companies like Warner Brothers, Ma-
chinima, or Sunday Riley Modern Skincare be able to escape liability.247  The 
FTC would have adequate mechanisms, such as civil penalties and dam-
ages,248 at its disposal to penalize and prevent this deceptive conduct.  With-
out the FTC mandating these contractual provisions, consumers are forced 
to rely on the self-regulating nature of social media platforms that “have little 
incentive to address this misinformation.”249 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Fyre Festival catastrophe highlighted the grotesque nature of in-
fluencer marketing by demonstrating the injustice that results from failed in-
fluencer disclosure.  With influencer marketing growing rapidly and fraudu-
lent practices becoming rampant, the FTC must save the industry from itself.  
Unfortunately, precedent has shown that “voluntary compliance” does not 
have the same impact on violators as mandatory compliance.250  By codify-
ing elements of the Endorsement Guides and other FTC guides into formal 
rules, the FTC would hold companies and influencers accountable for the 
profits they accrue from the digital marketing method.251  Moreover, there is 
no opportunity for companies or influencers to escape liability where the 
FTC requires that each contractual agreement include specific provisions 
mandating endorsements reflect the honest opinion of the endorser and dis-
closures be stated clearly and conspicuously.252  With the FTC implementing 
these two changes, a marketing method built on falsities would become but 
a memory in our distant past. 
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